

## Chapter 7

# THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

*In the last decades, some Nobel prizes have been awarded for concepts dealing with self-organization in the natural sciences. Correspondingly, the interdisciplinary discourse on systems theory has had a growing influence on many disciplines. If we consider psychology to be the science dealing with the most complex system on earth—namely the self-reflexive, creative-imaginative human being, influenced by processes on different levels such as society and its culture, as well as the physiology and biology of the body and, moreover, by the most complex biological system, namely the human brain—then it is quite remarkable to notice that psychology to a great extent uses rather reductive, simple, mechanistic models of cause and effect of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and refers to principles and metaphors which became obscure in the natural sciences in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.*

*Proof was given that some fundamental principles of the mechanistic age are—at least in such general terms*

*as were tacitly assumed—simply false. These principles work only under very restricted conditions and constraints, which are adequate for machines but, as it turned out, inadequate for entities where complex recursive processes are essential. This is true for living beings and, to an even greater extent, for human beings (because of their self-reflexive consciousness, which changes behavior into action based on thoughts and images of future action).*

*But it is not only the adequacy of concepts and principles in psychology that must be critically scrutinized in order to understand processes beyond the laboratory and its artificial restrictive conditions (although, without any doubt, these procedures are of value for the investigation of many questions for which these constraints are adequate). Moreover, it is a problem that the more complex and less reductive approaches like the concepts of humanistic psychology are devalued for not being “scientific” or “effective”.*

*As a consequence, I felt the need to publish some papers to encourage people not to reduce their world of living (or their world of understanding) to the adequacy of a lab in order to be “scientific” and to prevent devaluation of their thoughts and work. In contrast, I want to encourage people to enter the discourses on “science”, “effectiveness”, “quality” etc. courageously.*

In the program for this, the 3rd meeting of the German Psychological Association (BDP), the organizing committee have briefly but succinctly—and in my opinion very accurately—described the current Zeitgeist:

*“Our society of growth is shaped by the quest for effectiveness and efficiency. Goals should be realized in the shortest possible time and with a minimal expense of*

*energy and effort. Behind all this lies the intention to minimize costs and maximize profits. Social abilities and skills, and sensibility towards self and others are frequently left behind...*"

As a matter of fact, the “economistic”<sup>1</sup> priority of profit maximization also brings psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychology into a problematic situation. With a focus on efficacy alone—and, as I’ll show, with a very one-sided meaning of effectiveness at that—many psychologists and psychotherapists find it extremely difficult to fit the so-called “inherent necessities” of our social and health system. These “necessities” result in the devaluation of certain aspects of living, which were, once upon a time, almost essential for the career choice of psychologist or therapist, and have now become untenable luxuries. Here I’m speaking of qualities such as humanity, sensitivity, empathy, positive regard, and a personal relationship in professional encounters, among others. What’s more, the practitioner who has these qualities should be ashamed of himself for being “ineffective” (and this is often still equated with being under-qualified)—or at the very least should seek to “further qualify” himself.

This compulsion towards efficacy was passed on to psychology as science in the form of a demand that psychology should primarily devote itself to such questions. This can be observed, for example, in the current debate

---

<sup>1</sup> By “economistic” – in contrast to “economic or economical” – I mean the current trend for typically short-term and partitioned profit maximization. Economistic behavior neglects an extensive honest balancing of accounts that also considers long-term effects. It ignores the fact that many psychosocial benefits which are currently suffering from cutbacks would also arguably be “taken into account” if there were a fair economic calculation. However, such benefits appear to be “ineffective” and “uneconom(ist)ic” when costs – e.g. for illness, superannuation, etc. – can be passed on to the general public and delayed until “later”, while in the short term, profits are skimmed off privately.

concerning the efficacy of psychotherapy, as considered only from the perspective of evidence based medicine (ebm). Some of the questions that arose as a result—for example, regarding which form of psychotherapy and how much of it the social security system should pay for—are unquestionably important and require careful discussion (far more careful, incidentally, than is actually taking place in the slipstream left by the egoistic interests of the small power-groups involved). But by debating almost exclusively these questions, it seems that certain programs that are intended to support personal development for example, or individuation, or other such (economistically) “unproductive” ideas, have actually become discredited in the process (even though nobody actually expected that the social security system should pay). All that has been painstakingly achieved by psychology in the last hundred years - the lengthy catalog of the capabilities and achievements of the advancement of human development - is in danger of being reduced almost exclusively to an “elimination of symptoms”. Accordingly, we are confronted with the argument: “what cannot be calculated and proven to bring or save more money in a shorter time is also worth nothing, and should therefore under no circumstances be seriously pursued any further.”

In the rush and bustle of such short-sighted arguments which honor the *Zeitgeist*, even simple structural contexts are also often overlooked. In this way, for example, a number of perfectly serious therapeutic approaches were accused of having provided insufficient scientific evidence—or no evidence at all—for their efficacy. It may be acceptable to hear this from health politicians, but when scientists raise such accusations, one has to ask if something is being ignored here—namely that the task of producing evidence for or against effectiveness is not one for therapists, rather for scientists. Consequently, it's not

an omission on the part of the “therapeutic schools” (whoever may be meant by that); instead, it is the fault of the scientists. They are responsible for the lack of research—particularly concerning those approaches that have spread considerably among the practitioners in the last decades. In spite of this, the representatives of these criticized therapeutic approaches often react in a subdued, embarrassed, and apparently guilty way, instead of loudly denouncing the shortfall of the “critical” scientists. They also neglect to ask where the billions of Euro of tax-payers' money have actually gone, given that no evidence for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the psychotherapeutic approach—let's call “X”—has yet been put forward. The (understandable) career and publication dependent preference for a certain kind of hypothesis and experimental design that is found in mainstream psychological research is as a consequence now being suddenly elevated to the position of politically defining health standards, and any omissions are being blamed on those who are not yet actually responsible for research—neither financially or institutionally. And this sleight of hand is obviously working very well!

It is also a sign of the times when the confusion surrounding “effectiveness” gives priority to certain approaches that involve operationalization and measurability—for example, when technological medicine, focused on pieces of apparatus and machines and its directly measurable effects, is judged to be much more effective than apparently “vague” preventative interventions because their effects are much more difficult to measure. But is it really a matter of effectiveness, when for example the victim of a failed suicide attempt who has already been lying in a coma for months without hope of recovery and at a cost of millions, is denied a natural death because of the machines keeping him alive, while at the same time the resources and staff in many institutions

devoted to reducing the number of such suicides are subject to sizeable cuts. Or isn't it even more important to consider that the groups promoting technology intensive medicine have more money than those promoting preventative social therapy, and thus have better lobby groups in the governments?

These questions show that by taking the usual interpretation of “effectiveness”, the situation—which seems so clear and unambiguous during public debate—is not so straightforward. I don't however want to pursue these questions any further. Rather, I would like to move on to a much more central problem in the ideology of effectiveness. When we permit the “figure of thought” which constructs a contrast between effectiveness and humanity, then by accepting this play on words and thought we are already in a weakened position. If we are pleading for the humane—and, for example, for humanistic psychology—then from the perspective of this contrast, we must defend ourselves and apologize for not being (more) effective. We may perhaps justify this obvious lack of professionalism or scientific foundation by appeal to personal preference, ethical motives, or whatever else, but at the same time we have also acquired the appearance of not satisfying apparently reasonable demands. We then become shamed into submission or silence, and troubled by self-doubt, because we “feel” and “believe” something that evidently is not accepted and rationally grounded, or at least is not effective.

But the title of my paper is *not* “How can we remain effective in spite of a humanistic approach” (or vice versa). Rather, I have deliberately broken through the pseudo-alternative, and spoken about the “effectiveness of the humanistic approach”. As is shown by the modern natural sciences—particularly if we consider systems theory which is based on the natural sciences—it is precisely those principles that are essential for “the humanistic ap-

proach” that are effective. Indeed, in the technological transfer of system theoretical discoveries to industrial use, which has become increasingly important in physical and chemical technology for example, these “humanistic” principles must be taken into consideration in order for these technologies to really become effective.

What do I mean in this context by “humanistic” principles? Perhaps the easiest way to explain this is by reference<sup>2</sup> to (a reduced version of) “the six characteristics of working with living beings”, which were formulated by the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger in 1962 (see chapter 4). It is also worth mentioning here that I am convinced that every practitioner in the field of psychotherapy should (and if he is not unsuccessful: does<sup>3</sup>) take these characteristics into account.

One could try to disparage these “characteristics” by branding them as an expression of “over-enthusiasm” on the part of humanistic psychology, and claiming that they are missing any “scientific basis”. Some presumptuous “go-getters” have indeed tried to “argue” this way. However, a few years after Metzger's synopsis of these characteristics from the perspective of Gestalt and Humanistic psychology, modern chaos and system theory began its rapid development in the natural sciences. The importance of this development has perhaps been most obviously evidenced by Nobel Prize wins (in other words, a wider recognition by the mainstream of the scientific community within the natural sciences). Amazingly, this new development stresses that exactly those principles (in contrast to some principles of the classical approach in science) corresponding to Metzger's “characteristics” are

---

<sup>2</sup> discussed in more detail in Walter 1985, cf. Kriz 1994

<sup>3</sup> Although the “official” understanding of the process may, according to the particular school, follow other concepts and discuss other theoretical and technical terms.

the essential principles.

But before I get to systems theory in the narrower sense, I would first like to pick up on another long-standing ideological misunderstanding that is important in this context—namely the misinterpretation of “growth”. In the text of the organizing committee (mentioned at the beginning), the following question is posed: “Can psychology resist the unfettered focus on growth in some way, and if so—how?” I would like to reply that we can orient ourselves towards “growth” in nature—that is, we can focus on exactly the field from which the idea of growth was first borrowed, and then improperly reinterpreted.

If we look at trees<sup>4</sup>, for example, then we see that the essence of growth is in no way a matter of the accumulation of “more and more” of something—for instance of wood or biomass. Such increases do admittedly play a role, particularly in the early stages, but are of minor importance when compared with the aspect of the development of possibilities, or with the constantly renewed adaptation to environmental conditions, or with the “die and become” as Goethe put it (seen, for example, in deciduous trees with their loss of leaves in Fall and budding of new leaves in Spring). It is exactly these aspects that are meant by the concept of “personality growth” for instance (and not a hypertrophied “more and more”). Our economic representatives (and their political lackeys) have certainly perverted this essential qualitative aspect of growth and turned it into something purely quantitative. From their perspective, growth is only a matter of increasing existing quantities, measured in percentages (and “die” would then be nothing more than an unpleasant decrease in this number). Given a planet, which is something that cannot physically increase in size and in

---

<sup>4</sup> further elaborated in Kriz 1993

any case seems to be at maximum load with respect to some aspects (ozone depletion, pollution, exploitation of natural resources), it is in fact necessary to fiercely oppose this growth ideology. With a conception of growth that is in accordance and in tune with nature, however, we have nothing to worry about!

We now come—very briefly<sup>5</sup>—to the essentials of systems theory (based in science)<sup>6</sup>, because these (not coincidentally) have a lot to do with the aforementioned “natural” growth. Here we are concerned with phenomena such as “chemical clocks”. These chemical reactions, by now quite famous, don’t uniquely connect specific reagents with definite results; rather these reactions proceed dynamically, developing spreading patterns over space and time, and changing the chemical context in a particular place in periodic oscillations. With corresponding admixtures, other features like the color can also periodically change, let’s say: red-blue-red-blue-red... like the pendulum of a clock—hence the name “chemical clock”. Another phenomenon that is possibly even more generally known is the LASER—a system that emits extreme coherent light(waves), that can be so sharply focused that objects can be cut with it (an application which has by now been used in the fields of medicine or technology for many different functions and in many variations).

I would like, however, to explain the essential principles using an even simpler system, the so-called Bénard Instability. As a psychologist, my choice to use a physical system and not the dynamics of a family as an example is due to the fact that such a physical system is more easily definable and less complicated, and can also be looked at

---

<sup>5</sup> for more detail see e.g. Kriz 1992, Kriz 1997a

<sup>6</sup> it should be noted that there are other narratives and discourses which use or refer to the term “systems theory”, discussed especially in some philosophical and sociological groups.

with much more ideological detachment than a family.

The phenomenon of Bénard cells was already known and described almost one hundred years ago, but was first theoretically explained during the development of modern systems theory. The underlying facts are easy to describe: a liquid in a circular container is heated from below, and as is the case when you heat water on the stove at home, the difference in temperature between the warmer fluid at the bottom and the cooler surface is equalized by convection currents. This means that hot—and thus lighter—parts move upwards, and colder—thus heavier—parts move downwards. By continually increasing the heat<sup>7</sup>, a critical value can be found, at which point a sudden, qualitative change takes place—an ordered movement of the entire liquid in the form of macroscopic rolling movements, which are called “convection rolls”. Uncountably many molecules are cooperatively involved in each rolling movement (as shown schematically in Fig. 7.1a). What is even more interesting is that the rolling movements typically take on the complicated shape of a honeycomb pattern (seen from above in Fig. 7.1b).

The Bénard Instability can be seen as a simple but typical example of self-organization, because the liquid forms this macroscopic structure (which, as we will later discuss, can be described as the order parameter of a field) from itself. This order is not introduced as “order” by external factors, for instance by someone stirring the liquid in such a way as to make the rolling movements appear (as was typically thought in the “classical” understanding of intervention).

---

<sup>7</sup> or more precisely, the difference in temperature found at the bottom of the container and at the surface. Therefore, if you just use water, you would have to cool the surface in order to compensate for the large convection movement. However, using special oils (which allow for less convection), it suffices to heat the container from below.




Fig.7.1: The Bénard Instability. (a) Rolling movements (schematic view from the side), (b) honeycomb shaped rolling patterns (seen from above).

Instead, quite unspecific conditions of the system's surroundings (here: the difference in temperature) lead to the self-organization of this highly differentiated dynamical structure, which must be understood as an inherent ordering structure of the system itself. A designer, for example, may want to see eight-sided rolling movements (instead of six-sided), because he thinks that this would be much more “aesthetic” or “creative”—but as eight-sided rolling movements are not in the inherent structure of the system, they cannot be produced.

Similarly, the “designers of animal behavior” (i.e. tamers) had to learn that they could shape the behavior of a raccoon very well by “operant conditioning”—as long as the raccoon was, for example, dealing with one single coin (so the space of possibilities is rather big). However, giving the raccoon two coins means that “nature” works in another way: the raccoon will rub the two coins together—that is its inherent possibility when dealing with two coins. Therefore, it is not a question of ethics but of effectiveness to refrain from attempting to impose any “behavior-order” on a raccoon.

As a consequence, even with regard to animal behavior, scientists had to learn that they must respect inherent

structural forces and that they cannot teach, shape or design everything without any limitations. Accordingly, Humanistic Psychologists stress the point that this is not only true for raccoons but also for human beings: many inherent structures—on the evolutionary and biological level as well as on the biographic and cultural level—have to be respected. And again, it is not only a question of ethics but also one of effectiveness.

What makes the crucial difference between the effectiveness in dealing with systems from the modern perspective of systems science, and the idea of effectiveness in everyday life, which is still strongly governed by the ideologies of classical mechanistic Western science (and which, in accordance, governs the cognitive world of far too many psychologists and doctors)?

The classical mechanistic Western ideology was determined through interactions with dead material in artificially isolated systems. From this perspective, all parts of the world and the mechanisms (!) of change can be described by the laws of mechanics. This almost perfectly fits the equally artificial realm of technical instruments and machines. Even “movement” and “change” are understood as being static<sup>8</sup> because non-linear jumps in the development, emergence of new features etc., which are essential for complex systems—especially living systems—are beyond the conception of the classical model. Dealing with such “classical” systems is therefore a matter of “tin can ideology”, as I once put it.<sup>9</sup> From the perspective of that ideology, one can take a dented tin can whose shape is not acceptable due to its “dis-order”, and remove the dents (i.e. establish “order”) or impose any number of other design ideas upon it. You could, for ex-

---

<sup>8</sup>In fact, thermodynamics could even be renamed thermostatics from the viewpoint of today's dynamical systems research.

<sup>9</sup>cf. Kriz 1986

ample, press it into an Easter bunny shape. Local, causal effects are then typical and successful, and there is a high correlation between the magnitude and direction of energy expended and the result.

For removing dents of a tin can this procedure is undoubtedly effective. However, it can be asked if this procedure is the best metaphor for all kind of intervention.

In the 20th century, and even more so in the last decades, natural science has had to realize that the typical classical systems—which are isolated and non-recursive—can, at best, only give an appropriate model of nature for restricted cases in particular areas and over a short time span. As soon as one broadens the scope of such systems—especially when one takes the dynamics of feedback into account—the characteristic essentials of systems theory apply. This is already necessary for the ever-growing subject areas that deal with interacting systems of dead material. For the life sciences—i.e. biology, medicine, psychology etc.—ignoring feedback in the systems being studied can lead to fundamental confusions. The systems that are observed in the life sciences were not “made” by humans under restricted artificial technical conditions, but they evolved in our natural world. And this is also true for systems which evolve in a comparatively short period of time, as in the case of ontogenesis or sociogenesis, the genesis of a couple structure, pathogenesis, etc.

Furthermore, living systems do not “function” under isolated environmental conditions that can be kept constant by artificial means. On the contrary, these systems are self-organized, and their essential functional capability lies in their ability to adapt to changes in environmental conditions (or better: to realize a dynamic co-evolution in the face of these reciprocal changes).

Systems theory, then, investigates and discusses self-

organized systems whose dynamical structures are supported and facilitated by interventions, but ultimately cannot be “made” (unlike the tin Easter bunny). And dealing with such systems is a fundamentally different matter. Even a waterfall, unlike a tin can, cannot be “smoothed out” with a hammer or some other tool when its shape or structure is not to someone's liking. More successful—in other words: effective—interventions must therefore take the intrinsic structure (or even better: the space of possible intrinsic structures) of the system into account. The “history” and the developmental stage of the system must, as we've seen, be taken into consideration—and depending on the stage the system is in, the “same” intervention can have a greater or lesser effect. In sensitive phases of the development of the system, small interventions may suffice to bring about a large and fast qualitative change; while even strong “inputs” may show no effect in stable phases.

In short, exactly those principles which were characterized above as principles of Humanistic Psychology—and summarized by Metzger as characteristics of working with living beings—must be taken into account when dealing with physical or chemical “dead” systems (unless these systems are isolated and feedback free) if the scientists concerned with these systems want to be “effective”. This correspondence should become ever clearer when we put together the essential aspects once again (see Table 1 in chapter 4).

Strictly speaking, all of this is actually nothing new and exciting. People have been aware of this—at least implicitly—for centuries in the essential experiential areas of life. And people went along with these principles when they benefited from “nature” and didn't want to cause any damage. Every farmer and gardener, for example, knows that the order they see develop is not “made” like tin Easter bunnies, and that their task is not to en-

courage accelerated growth of their plants by impatiently pruning them, or to trim the leaves of a “diseased” tree into the “correct” shape with a pair of nail scissors. All of these attempts would be just as absurd as they are ineffective.

This doesn't mean, however, that man is condemned to idleness. Rather, “effectiveness” calls for an exact mixture of permissiveness, tolerance, respect for intrinsic forms and dynamics, sensitivity in choosing the right moment in order to facilitate the systems dynamic by providing for favorable conditions in the system's environment.

It is exactly this that mothers have done with their growing fetuses for thousands of years. It's possible to surgically remove the fetus after 5 months, and to use all the techniques of modern medical technology—perhaps further optimized with artificial insemination—to get more children in a shorter time from the same mother. But this area has so far been spared from this kind of recently propagated idea of “effectiveness”, thank goodness.<sup>10</sup>

The new scientific findings are therefore much less surprising than the fact that—contrary to the experience of the majority of people on this planet—the only “source” of order that has been researched and propagated by Western science concerns its production and control, and that scientific efforts have been devoted extensively to the breakdown of order (within the scope of thermodynamics). This is certainly not insignificantly connected to the fact that a manufactured and monitored order suits the interests of those in power much better than a concept of autonomous, self-organized order.

Correspondingly, one of the central dominating themes

---

<sup>10</sup> Although, maybe it's not completely spared, when one considers the sperm bank with sperm from Nobel prizewinner, which has already been used by “simple-minded” women.

of classical Western science and technology was—and still is—Vico's verdict of 1710: *verum et factum convertuntur* (the true and the made are convertible). Hans Primas from ETH-Zurich is equally critical: “In today's scientific practice, producibility and feasibility are in the end the de facto criterium for correctness in scientific thinking” (Primas 1995, p.212). And in the book “Chaos, Fear and Order” (Kriz 1997b), I showed how the necessary human ability to avoid fear-inducing chaos and establish order is, in general, very easily taken too far, and can lead to compulsive ordering. I also pointed out that exactly this fantasy of control was seen during the very early days of Western science, in the work of the “founding fathers” Bacon, Descartes and Newton. This was again a defense against fear—fear of the archaic female way of understanding and approaching the world (for example in the form of the alternative knowledge of witches), of uniqueness and of the uncontrollable.

Although I don't want to explain this again here, it is still notable how surprisingly well the mechanisms that we interpret as typical symptoms in a compulsive patient's defense against fear and anxiety correspond to the principles lauded as “virtues” of a clean and faultless methodology by Western science—and also by psychology textbooks. These principles<sup>11</sup> are:

---

<sup>11</sup>Abraham Maslow, one of the fathers of humanistic psychology, similarly expressed this sentiment in his book “Psychology of Science” (Maslow 1966) by entitling a chapter “The Pathology of Recognition: Anxiety Reducing Mechanisms of Knowledge”. In another chapter, we find a list of 21 ‘pathological’ ‘primarily anxiety-related’ forms which manifest in our need to ‘acquire knowledge, to know, and to understand.’ A further chapter begins: “Science can, therefore, so serve defense. It can be primarily a philosophy of security, a defense system, a complex tool for avoiding anxiety.”

- the most extensive elimination of the unpredictable and uncontrollable,
- the reduction of influencing variables,
- the most extensive prediction of the results of actions,
- maximal control of all things that can happen,
- concealing one's own motives and emotions behind a “correct” methodology,
- restriction of experiences to the region that is pre-defined by those questions and procedures that are considered to be “acceptable” and “permitted”.

When we have grasped all of these, what can we do, concretely?

The most important aspect that I wanted to develop here was to argue for the effectiveness of the principles of Humanistic Psychology in opposition to the ideology of an effectiveness based on principles of mechanistic science. To call the latter “scientific” in order to accuse the Humanistic Approach of being “unscientific” is in itself pseudo-scientific and pseudo-factual because it ignores the fact that the so-called “scientific” principles of a mechanistic understanding of interventions became antiquated when viewed from the perspective of modern science. In contrast, the principles of Humanistic Psychology and modern systems science correspond very well (without pleading for a reduction of Humanistic Psychology to natural sciences!).

As a consequence, there is no reason at all to sheepishly apologize for working on the principles of Humanistic Psychology. The incorrectly posed dichotomy of “effective or humanistic” and the misunderstood “scientific bases” of a mechanistic worldview should not make people shut up. Rather, it calls for progressive support of the principles of the Humanistic Approach. In such discussions, we must be prepared for resistance and fear of

those who continue to demand “order” and “effectiveness” purely through control and only by means of quantitative measures of quality<sup>12</sup>. We can, however, be sure of support from the natural sciences. And so we can hope that the effectiveness of the Humanistic Psychological Approach will overcome the contemporary anti-humanistic effectiveness that is—together with other absurdities of misunderstood “science”—hostile to human life processes.

### *References*

- Johnson LD, Shaha S (1996): Improving quality in psychotherapy. *Psychotherapy*, 33, 225-236
- Kriz, J. (1992) *Chaos und Struktur. Systemtheorie Bd 1*. München, Berlin: Quintessenz
- Kriz, J. (1993) *In der Baumschule. Scheidewege*, 23, 1993, Bd II, 432-439
- Kriz, J. (1997b): *Chaos, Angst und Ordnung. Wie wir unsere Lebenswelt gestalten*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
- Kriz, J. (1997a) *Systemtheorie. Eine Einführung für Psychotherapeuten, Psychologen und Mediziner*. Wien: Facultas
- Maslow, A. (1966) *The Psychology of Science*. New York: Harper & Row
- Primas, H. (1995) *Über dunkle Aspekte der Naturwissenschaft*. In: *Atmanspacher, Harald, et al. (Hrsg.): Der Pauli-Jung-Dialog und seine Bedeutung für moderne Wissenschaft*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 205-238
- Walter, H.-J. (1985) *Gestalttheorie und Psychotherapie*. 2. Aufl. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag

---

<sup>12</sup> In spite of some critical discussion that the “quality control” and Quality Assurance (QA) used by managed care organizations do not appear to directly address quality of services and, moreover, factually hinder innovation and more practical measures of outcome (Johnson & Shaha, 1996), this reductive idea of “quality” is increasingly imposed on psychotherapy.